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BOGGS V. BOGGS:
CREATING REAL-LIFE CINDERELLAS
HEATHER J. ROSE*

INTRODUCTION
Once upon a time there was a rich, kindly old man, Mr.
He lived with his wife and their three sons in
Money-Bags.'
2
Louisiana. While he was working, Mr. Money-Bags invested in a
pension plan that included stock options, a 401K plan, a
retirement bonus, and other benefits. After about thirty-five years
of marriage, his first wife died. Because she lived in a state in
which assets were owned equally by husband and wife, her
husband received a life estate in her share of his pension plan
benefits. According to her will, their sons would receive her share
of the benefits upon her husband's death.
Mr. Money-Bags remarried the next year. His second wife
had her own money, and no children were born from this
marriage. About four years after his remarriage, Mr. Money-Bags
died. His will left his former wife a life estate in his pension plan
benefits, and his sons were to receive all of the benefits upon her
death. He left the remainder of the estate to his second wife.
The second wife wanted the entire estate for herself, so she
sued both the estate and the sons in their individual capacities,
claiming that she was being deprived of her rightful income. The
court agreed with the second wife and said that she should receive
all of the pension plan benefits. As a result of the suit, the sons
received nothing from either parent's estate.3 The sons now work
three jobs to support themselves because of the court's decision.4
* J.D. Candidate, June 2000. The Author would like to thank Professor
Kathryn Kennedy for all of her help and support throughout the writing
process.
1. See generally Cinderella,in THE CANDLEWICK BOOK OF FAIRY TALES 83

(Sarah Hayes, text retold by, Candlewick Press 1982) (recounting the fairytale
on which the hypothetical is loosely based). See also Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S.
833, 833 (1997) (setting forth facts upon which the hypothetical is also based).
2. Louisiana is one of the community property states in the United States.
Gerald B. Treacy, Jr., Planning to Preserve the Advantages of Community
Property, 23 EST. PLAN. 24, 24 (1996).
3. Unfortunately for the sons, there are no princesses to sweep them away
from poverty and take them to a wonderful castle to live happily ever after.
4. This hypothetical situation does not necessarily reflect the true ending
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Can this really happen? Unfortunately, according to the
recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in Boggs v.
Boggs,5 the answer is yes. The Supreme Court held in Boggs that
the second wife was entitled to all of the husband's benefits.' In
Boggs, the Supreme Court allowed the second wife to inherit
everything from the husband's estate because, according to their
reading of the legislative history and purpose of the Employee
Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA), to do otherwise would be
"unfair."7 While this decision applies mainly to community
property states,8 it affects other states by preempting any state
law that relates to an ERISA pension plan.9
of Boggs. Boggs, 520 U.S. at 854.
5. Id. In Boggs, the Court held that the second wife could not be deprived
of a full share of her husband's estate, even though the couple lived in
Louisiana, a community property state. Id. at 852. In the nine community
property states alone, the Boggs decision may affect 80 million people. Judy
Peres, High Court Rulings Help to Define Reach of Federal Pension Act, CHI.
TRIB., June 3, 1997, § 3, at 3.
6. Boggs, 520 U.S. at 853.
7. Id. at 844; Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C.
§ 1001 (1997), amended by Retirement Equity Act of 1984, 29 U.S.C. § 1055
(1997). The Court found that the protection afforded to beneficiaries by
ERISA "would be undermined by allowing a predeceasing spouse's heirs and
legatees to have a community property interest in the survivor's annuity."
Boggs, 520 U.S. at 844. In fact, as the Court pointed out, not only may heirs
not take a non-participating, surviving spouse's right to the benefits, but even
a plan participant may not do so. Id. The Court noted that it would be
anomalous for Congress to allow a predeceasing spouse to do that which a plan
participant could not. Id. "Nothing in the language of ERISA supports
concluding that Congress made such an inexplicable decision." Id.
8. This is true because the parties in Boggs lived in Louisiana, which is a
community property state. Boggs, 520 U.S. at 835.
9. Boggs v. Boggs Holds that a PredeceasingNonparticipantSpouse Has
No Property Interest in an ERISA Pension Plan, 6 NO. 3 ERISA LITIG. REP. 4
(1997) [hereinafter Boggs v. Boggs Holds . . .]. In this article, the authors
noted that ERISA preempts state law, notwithstanding whether a state
follows the community property doctrine, "to the extent that law treats a
predeceasing nonparticipant spouse as having any type of property right in
the participant spouse's pension plan." Id. By holding that the second wife
was entitled to the entirety of the plan benefits, the Court invalidated the first
wife's testamentary transfer of her interest in the benefits. Boggs, 520 U.S. at
848. See Tony Vecino, Note, Boggs v. Boggs: State Community Property and
Succession Rights Wallow in ERISA's Mire, 28 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 571,
572 (1998). Mr. Vecino points out that "[u]nder general principles of state
community property law, the Court's holding divests a nonparticipant spouse
of a present ownership right and of testamentary power over an interest in the
community pension plan benefits." Id. See generally Boggs, 520 U.S. at 83953 (explaining how ERISA can and does preempt a non-participating,
predeceasing spouse's property ownership interest in the participating
spouse's pension plan). Because in a community property state the first wife
has a present, vested interest in one-half of the pension plan benefits, this
holding reverses state community property law in the area of testamentary
transfers. Id. at 835-39. A "testamentary transfer" is the transfer of money or
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Part I of this Comment examines the history of ERISA ° and
the Retirement Equity Act (REA)."
Part I also analyzes the
history of federal preemption of state law and the Court's decision
in Boggs v. Boggs. Part II of this Comment analyzes the effects of
the Supreme Court's decision on probate law. Finally, Part III
proposes an amendment to ERISA that would solve the dilemma
in which some families now find themselves as a consequence of
the Boggs decision.
I.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF ERISA, PREEMPTION
AND BOGGS V. BOGGS

In order to understand the problem, it is necessary to know
the history of ERISA, REA and community property laws. It is
also necessary to understand the implications of Boggs, as well as
the various ways ERISA already allows plan participants to assign
or alienate their benefits. Lastly, it is essential to understand the
different preemption tests the Supreme Court has used in deciding
whether a federal statute should preempt a state law.
Section A examines the legislative histories and purposes of
ERISA and REA. Section B discusses in some detail Qualified
Domestic Relations Orders (QDROs) and other methods for
assigning or alienating benefits. Section C explores the history
and function of community property laws. Section D explains the
Boggs case by examining the facts and its procedural history.
Finally, Section E examines the history of federal preemption of
state law.
A.

Once Upon a Tme...

Before ERISA was enacted, the U.S. pension plan system was
problematic. 2
The most serious problem was poor plan
administration, which left participants without any retirement
benefits." Another serious problem was the practice of firing an
employee just as his or her benefits vested, leaving the participant
without any benefits."'
The private pension system became an important social
concern of the 1940s. 5 Around that time, about four million people

property accomplished by means of a will. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1474,

1497 (6th ed. 1990).
10. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1001
(1997), amended by Retirement Equity Act of 1984, 29 U.S.C. § 1055 (1997).
11. Retirement Equity Act of 1984, 29 U.S.C. § 1055.
12. H.R. REP. No. 93-533, at 2 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639,
4640.
13. Id. at 4643.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 4640 (observing that the private pension plans are fairly new and
only began to gain importance in the mid-1940s). In the 1940s, the American
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were covered by such plans." By 1950, about ten million people
were covered, more than a twofold increase from 1940.17 By 1960,
more than twenty-one million people were covered by pension
plans in the United States;"6 by 1973, the number jumped to more
than thirty million.' 9 In 1997, in the nine community property
states alone, eighty million people had more than one trillion
dollars invested in pension plans.2 0
Before Congress enacted ERISA, pension plans were governed
by a series of federal statutes.' Congress determined that plan
participants were not sufficiently protected from abuses that
occurred in the administration of the plans under the Welfare and
Pension Plans Disclosure Act.22
Congress, therefore, enacted
ERISA to "protect the interest of... pension plan participants and
beneficiaries through disclosure of information with respect to
such plans. "'

economy matured to the point where employers recognized that they needed to
care for their employees even after employment. Id. The other social
development contributing to the increased use of pension plans was the
change from a rural, farming culture to the modern, urban culture. Id.
16. Id. at 4641.
17. H.R. REP. No. 93-533, at 4641.
18. Id.
19. Id. Not only were over 30 million people covered by pension plans, but
such plans also comprised over $150 billion in assets. Id.
20. Boggs, 520 U.S. at 833, 840.

21. H.R. REP. NO. 93-533 at 4641. ERISA's direct predecessor was known
as the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act. Welfare and Plans
Disclosure Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-836, 72 Stat. 997 (1958). The very first
statute to affect pension plans, however, was the National Labor Relations
Act. National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1994). After
the National Labor Relations Act, the Labor Management Relations Act
affected pension plans. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 141-44, 167, 171-87 (1994). The next act to affect pension plans before
ERISA was the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act. Labor
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-02, 41115, 431 (1994).
22. H.R. REP. NO. 93-533 at 4641. The Welfare and Pension Plans
Disclosure Act was ERISA's direct predecessor. Id. Congress found that due
to "malfeasance and improper activities by pension administrators, trustees,
or fiduciaries," the Welfare and Plans Disclosure Act needed to be revised. Id.
The amendments made such abuses federal crimes and granted investigative
and regulatory powers to the Secretary of Labor over pension plans. Id. The
changes to the Welfare and Plans Disclosure Act, however, were not sufficient
to prevent the abuses the statute was supposed to correct. Id. Before
adopting ERISA, Congress conducted a study finding that pension plan
participants were losing benefits because of poor execution by the plan
administrators. Id. at 4646. In 1965, the President established a cabinet
committee to report on the state of pension plans. Id. The committee reported
that for the system to be fair and equitable, every employee with a pension
plan should be entitled to the security of knowing his retirement benefits
would be there at retirement. Id. at 4647.
23. Id. at 4646. Congress found that courts were reluctant to use equitable
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Congress found the most important purpose of ERISA to be
the American workers' assurance of "financial security and
dignity" during retirement.2 Through ERISA, Congress attempted
to create safeguards against past abuses, such as reporting
requirements and the accelerated vesting of plans throughout the
term of employment.'
The official policy of ERISA mandates
dealing with "malfeasance and maladministration" of pension
plans, along with a gamut of other issues.26 ERISA established
minimum standards designed to transform the "private pension
promise" into reality. 7 While ERISA was originally enacted to

remedies, like specific performance, to aid the pension plan participants and

their beneficiaries. Id. Specific performance allows the plan participants, or
their beneficiaries, to enforce their plan benefits, and is used to force the plan
administrator to follow the benefits as written. Id. at 4642-43.
Because equitable remedies were not sufficient to curb abuses,
Congress determined that a new statute was necessary to set forth remedies
for participants who lost money because of plan administrators. Id. at 4643.
Congress found that pension plans were being terminated so that employees
lost all, or some, of their benefits from their pension plans. Id. This occurred
even if the employee was fully vested in the plan, which means that he had
the right to the full benefits of the plan. Id. Congress noted that if one
participant's benefits were destroyed, that was one participant too many. Id.
Another purpose for the new statute was to provide security to the
participants. Id. The security provided is the knowledge that all of the
benefits remain intact and are guaranteed to remain intact for the
participants' and beneficiaries' lives. Id.
24. Id. at 4646. Congress also believed that it was important for American
workers to face retirement knowing they would have the resources necessary
to support themselves as real, active members of society. Id. Later in the
legislative history, Congress explained in detail why ERISA was necessary.
Id. at 4646-47. Congress cared about increasing qualified plans' fairness and
effectiveness and wanted to increase the number of employees covered by
pension plans. Id. Lastly, Congress changed the tax laws affecting pension
plans so that the new laws were fairer and more equitable in their execution.
Id. at 4676-77.
25. See id. at 4647 (explaining that "the Committee recognizes the absolute
need that safeguards for plan participants be sufficiently adequate and
effective to prevent the numerous inequities to workers under plans which
have resulted in tragic hardship to so many").
26. Id. at 4647-48.
The other issues range from the "adequacy of
funding... [to] adequate communication to participants." Id. ERISA is a
comprehensive legislative plan in order to achieve its goals. Id.
27. H.R. REP. No. 93-533 at 4648.
It is hereby declared to be the policy of this Act:
(1) to foster and facilitate interstate commerce,
(2) to alleviate certain problems which tend to discourage the
maintenance and growth of multiemployer pension plans,
(3) to provide reasonable protection for the interests of participants
and beneficiaries of financially distressed multiemployer pension
plans, and
(4) to provide a financially self-sufficient program for the guarantee
of employee benefits under multiemployer plans.
29 U.S.C. § 1001(c) (1997). But see Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 839-43 (1997) (noting
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cover the administration of plans, courts have extended the scope
of ERISA to also cover the distribution of funds.'
B. Then the Government Decreed that...
1. ERISA Was Not Sufficient as Written
ERISA alone was not sufficient to achieve Congress' goal of
protecting the benefits owed to pension plan participants.n Not
only did the President revise ERISA four times after its
enactment, but Congress also amended ERISA in 1984 through
the Retirement Equity Act (REA)."° REA was necessary in part

that ERISA is a comprehensive statute, enacted to protect spouses of plan
participants). The Court wrote that under ERISA, a participant's spouse is
entitled to more than he would be entitled to solely under community property
regimes. Id. at 840. Later, in the decision, the Court stated that the qualified
joint and survivor annuity provisions of ERISA provide a guaranty of benefits,
no matter whether a participant dies before or after the annuity starting date.
Id.
28. See Boggs, 520 U.S. at 852-55 (holding that ERISA covers not only the
plan administration, but continues to apply even when the benefits have been
distributed and are in the hands of the participant, or beneficiary). See also
Andrews-Clarke v. Travelers Ins. Co., 984 F. Supp. 49, 52-53 (D. Mass. 1997)
(holding that ERISA preempted any state tort action for wrongful death when
suing a medical care provider). Note that the Court in Boggs held that
ERISA's purpose was both to protect beneficiaries and to guarantee proper
administration of plans. Boggs, 520 U.S. at 833, 840.
29. In 1978, President Jimmy Carter sent his fourth plan for the
reorganization of ERISA to Congress. Message of the President, 29 U.S.C. §
1001(a) (1997).
To the Congress of the United States:
Today I am submitting to the Congress my fourth Reorganization
Plan for 1978. This proposal is designed to simplify and improve the
unnecessarily complex administrative requirements of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).... The new plan
will eliminate overlap and duplication in the administration of
ERISA and help us achieve our goal of well regulated private pension
plans.
ERISA was an essential step in the protection of worker pension
rights. Its administrative provisions, however, have resulted in
bureaucratic confusion and have been justifiably criticized by
employers and unions alike.... Under current ERISA provisions,
the Department of Treasury and Labor both have authority to issue
regulations and decisions. ...
Id.
30. Retirement Equity Act of 1984, 29 U.S.C. § 1055. (1997). See also
Boggs, 520 U.S. at 842 (noting that REA allows participants to designate a
beneficiary other than the spouse only if the spouse agrees to the designation
in writing); MICHAEL J. CANAN, QUALIFIED RETIREMENT AND OTHER
EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS, § 7.12 (1997) (commenting that before REA, an

employee's spouse could claim an interest in the retirement plan benefits
without running afoul of the spendthrift, or anti-alienation, provision in
ERISA).
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because Congress had not yet dealt with divorce issues inherent in
pension plan benefits nor with the possibility of the participant
dying before the beneficiary."'
In enacting REA, Congress
acknowledged that because some spouses were being denied their
benefits, the equitable remedies originally provided were
insufficient to protect the beneficiaries of the plans.3 '
REA allows for divorced spouses to recover some of the
pension plan benefits, so long as the spouses follow the correct
procedure" and receive a Qualified Domestic Relations Order
(QDRO) at the time of divorce.'
REA also ensures uniform
spousal rights, such as the right to receive all of the benefits from
the pension plan." Originally, Congress made benefits non31. S. REP. No. 98-575, at 1 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2547.

As evidenced by its silence in the legislative history, Congress still has not
dealt with the issue of non-participating spouses who die before the
participant and the distribution of the benefits. Id. Such spouses are also
known as non-participating, predeceasing spouses. Non-participating spouses
are spouses who do not contribute to the pension plan.
See also Ablamis v. Roper, 937 F.2d 1450, 1450 (9th Cir. 1991). In this
case, the court examined whether devises in a will were valid when it was the
predeceasing, nonparticipant's spouse's will and the devisees were children
from that spouse's first marriage. Id. at 1452. The court found the devises
unallowable under ERISA, as amended by REA, in part because of REA's
purpose of protecting a spouse's interest in the participant's plan benefits. Id.
at 1453. REA modified ERISA to primarily protect widows and divorcees and
insure their financial security. Id.
32. In order to improve receipt of retirement benefits while providing

greater equity for workers and their beneficiaries, Congress amended ERISA
by examining "marriage as an economic partnership and the substantial
contribution to that partnership of spouses who work both in and outside the
home." S. REP. No. 98-575 at 2547.
33. The correct procedure is to go to a family law court and have the judge
enter a special order, which meets the statutory requirements. 29 U.S.C. §
1056(d) (1997).
34. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B).
In the case of a judgment, decree, or order relating to child support,
alimony payments, or marital property rights pursuant to a State
domestic relations law that meets certain requirements (a qualified
domestic relations order), the bill clarifies that such order does not
result in a prohibited assignment or alienation of benefits under the
spendthrift provisions of the Code or ERISA. In addition, the bill
provides that the general ERISA preemption rule does not apply to
theses qualified domestic relations orders.
S. REP. No. 98-575 at 2549. REA created the qualified joint and survivor
annuity, the qualified pre-retirement survivor annuity, and the QDRO, or
qualified domestic relations order. Edward V. Atnally et al., Employee Benefit
Plans and Estate Planning,30 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 27, 29 (1995). REA

also places requirements, like obtaining the spouse's approval, on participants
before receiving payments from their plans before the plans mature. Id.
35. Jayne Elizabeth Zanglein, In the U.S. Supreme Court:Are Pensions for
the Living or the Dead? ERISA Preemption and State Community Property
Laws, WEST'S LEGAL NEWS 14647, Jan. 16, 1997 [hereinafter Zanglein, In the

U.S. Supreme Court]. "REA was enacted to address the burgeoning body of
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assignable to protectbeneficiaries by cementing their interests in
the benefits. 36 REA expanded the situations where a QDRO could
be issued, and therefore expanded the possibilities of alienation of
pension plans. 7
Now, a QDRO may be issued in a divorce
situation."s

2. Assignments of Benefits may be Allowed if...
While alienation and assignments are not usually allowed,
certain exceptions exist.39
With ERISA plans, for example,
alienation and assignment of benefits are allowed with a voluntary
The spendthrift section of ERISA1
and revocable waiver.4 °
"applies only to pension plan benefits." 2 The spendthrift section of
conflicting jurisprudence addressing spousal rights in plans and plan benefits,
particularly under community property regimes." Id. at 40 (internal citations
omitted).
36. S. REP. No. 98-575, at 2564. In general, benefits under a pension plan
covered by ERISA are non-assignable. Id. By making the benefits nonassignable, beneficiaries' interests were protected because the benefits could
not be given to anyone other than the beneficiary. Id.
37. Id. If all of the benefits, or a part of the benefits, must be distributed
according to a QDRO, then that alternate payee's right to the benefits is not
considered an alienation or assignment of the benefits. Id. In fact, under
REA, a divorced spouse is in a better position than a spouse who remains
married until death. Boggs v. Boggs Holds..., supra note 9, at 10.

38. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(ii) (1997). QDROs can also be issued when
child support payments are necessary. Id.
39. Id. Some plans are fully excluded from ERISA, and under those plans,
assignments and alienation of benefits are presumably allowed. 29 U.S.C. §
1001 (1997). ERISA provides for assignments or alienation of plan benefits in
the following manner:
(d) Assignment or alienation of plan benefits
(1) Each pension plan shall provide that benefits provided under the
plan may not be assigned or alienated.
(2) For the purposes of paragraph (1) of this subsection, there shall
not be taken into account any voluntary and revocable assignment of
not to exceed [ten] percent of any benefit payment, or of any
irrevocable assignment or alienation of benefits executed before
September 2, 1974. The preceding sentence shall not apply to any
assignment or alienation made for the purposes of defraying plan
administration costs....
(3)(A) Paragraph (1) shall apply to the creation, assignment, or
recognition of a right to any benefit payable with respect to a
participant pursuant to a domestic relations order, except that
paragraph (1) shall not apply if the order is determined to be a
qualified domestic relations order. Each pension plan shall provide
for the payment of benefits in accordance with the applicable
requirements of any qualified domestic relations order.
29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(2) & (3)(A) (1994).
40. Id.
41. The spendthrift provision of ERISA is the provision forbidding
alienation and assignment of benefits. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1).
42. Vecino, supra note 9, at 587. ERISA does not mention IRAs, 401K
plans, stock option plans or retirement bonuses, but concentrates instead on
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ERISA prevents benefits from being assigned to a party other than
the direct beneficiary.43
Some exceptions to the spendthrift
provision are specifically mentioned."
One specially mentioned exception is the QDRO.45 For a
domestic relations order to be considered a QDRO, certain specific
provisions must be met.' A QDRO is a judgment from a court that
relates to property rights under an ERISA plan.47 For example,
the order must acknowledge the alternate payee, i.e., the person
other than the current beneficiary, and the alternate payee's right
to receive payment from the plan.' The order must also identify
the name and last known mailing address of the participant and
beneficiary, the percentage (or the formula for deciding the
amount) of the benefits to be paid, and the number of payments
necessary." If the order does not meet these requirements, then
the order is not a QDRO, and its alienation is not allowed.5"
"pension plans." 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d).
43. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1). Therefore, if the participant is receiving an
annuity from his or her plan, the participant cannot choose an alternate
payee. Berry v. Kirkland, Civ.A.97-2212, No. 1998 WL 187823 at *1 (E.D. La.
Apr. 20, 1998). Here, the plaintiff was looking for a "redistribution of
retirement benefits and an ownership interest in those benefits which were
payable under two benefit plans in which her now deceased ex-husband
participated." Id. The justices in Berry noted that the Boggs Court held that
ERISA controls a survivor's annuity to the point that even participants cannot
designate a different beneficiary "unless the nonparticipant spouse agrees."
Id. The Berry court held that the plaintiff could not receive any such benefits
because she did not obtain a QDRO when she divorced her husband; in the
alternative, even if she had, his new wife did not voluntarily waive her rights
in the plans and benefits. Id.
44. The Supreme Court decided that if an exception to ERISA's application
is not mentioned specifically in ERISA's spendthrift provision, then that
exception cannot be allowed. See Ablamis v. Roper, 937 F.2d 1450, 1454 (9th
Cir. 1991) (citing Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat'l Pension Fund, 493 U.S.
365 (1990)). The Guidry Court specifically stated that for an exception to be
valid it must be expressly mentioned in the spendthrift provision of ERISA.
Id.
45. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3) (1997). Congress added the QDRO exception to
ERISA because some courts had decided that ERISA did not preempt state
"family support obligations." S. REP. No. 98-575 at 2564 (1984), reprinted in
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2547.
46. "[A] domestic relations order meets the requirements of this
subparagraph only if such order clearly specifies .... A domestic relations
order meets the requirements of this subparagraph only if such order...." 29
U.S.C. § 1056(C)-(D).
47. Id. However, courts have found that ordinary probate orders do not
meet the QDRO requirements. Ablamis, 937 F.2d at 1455.
48. Ablamis, 937 F.2d at 1455.
49. S. REP. No. 98-575, at 20.
50. Id. Even if a domestic relations order would otherwise be a QDRO, if it
requires a plan to provide for any benefit not otherwise provided for, provide
increased benefits, or beneficiary's payment from the benefits to pay a third
party, the order is not a QDRO. Id. See also Zanglein, In the U.S. Supreme
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C. Local Governments and Community Property
There are nine states that follow a community property
system concerning estate planning."' In a community property
state, marriage is considered an equal partnership with each
spouse contributing equally to the acquisition of assets during the
marriage."
Therefore, each spouse owns equally all assets
acquired during marriage.'
In community property states, when one spouse dies, the
surviving spouse owns at least one-half of the estate.5
This
ownership occurs automatically because of the community
property laws.55 The marriage community, or "partnership," ends
when a spouse dies.5" When this occurs, the surviving spouse must
provide an accounting to the decedent's estate for any community
property under the surviving spouse's control at the partnership's
Court, supra note 35, at § 4.0 (observing that QDROs are a special kind of

domestic court order which must meet statutory standards).
51. Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 840 (1997). The nine community property
states are: Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas,
Washington and Wisconsin. Treacy, supra note 2, at 24.
52. Boggs, 520 U.S. at 840.
53. Ablamis, 937 F.2d at 1450.
"[Community property law] is a
commitment to the equality of husband and wife and reflects the real
partnership inherent in the marital relationship." Boggs, 520 U.S. at 840.
Even though both spouses may acquire property during marriage, property
does not necessarily have to be divided equally as long as the decedent's estate
is divided in two, with one-half of the entire estate going to the surviving
spouse outright. Id. at 871. ERISA benefits, according to the holding in
Boggs, cannot be divided and therefore must be placed entirely in one estate or
the other. Id. at 873.
54. The Louisiana Civil Code requires a spouse to give an accounting "to
the other spouse for community property under his control at the termination
of the community property regime." LA. CIrv. CODE ANN. art. 2369 (West
1998). Community property assets vest in each spouse equally when acquired.
Boggs, 520 U.S. at 850-51. Upon the death of the first spouse, the surviving
spouse must logically own one-half of the community property outright,
without any transfers of interest. Id.
55. Jayne Elizabeth Zanglein, Fifth Circuit Survey, "Meyered" in the Bogg
of ERISA Preemption:Employee Benefits in the Fifth Circuit, 29 TEX. TECH. L.
REV. 581, 592 (1998) (citing Bailey v. New Orleans Steamship Ass'n/Intl
Longshoremen's Ass'n, 100 F.3d 28, 29 (5th Cir. 1996)) (holding the wife was
"'vested with a present undivided one-half interest in the portion of the
pension plan vested during the time of her marriage to Herman Bailey').
[hereinafter Zanglein, "Meyered" in the Bogg of ERISA]. In community
property states, each spouse has a one-half interest in all property acquired
during the marriage. Boggs, 520 U.S. at 871-72. That interest is fully vested
at the time the asset is acquired, and therefore the spouses are similar to joint
tenants. See id. at 837 (stipulating that "absent pre-emption, Louisiana law
controls and that under it, Dorothy's will would dispose of her community
property interest in Isaac's undistributed pension plan benefits").
56. Tristan E. Propst, Note, Boggs v. Boggs: The Fifth Circuit Finds ERISA
Does Not Preempt Louisiana Community Property Law, 71 TUL. L. REV. 1005,
1007-08 (1997) (citing LA. CiV. CODE ANN. art. 2356 (West 1985)).
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end. "7 Survivors of the decedent also have the statutory right to
demand an accounting of the estate's value.'
D. This is the Story of a Family Named "Boggs"
The Boggs case involved the father's second wife, his children
and ERISA. 59 The children sued for an accounting of their father's
estate in order to collect their share. ° The United States Supreme
Court found that the sons had no rights, due to an invalid
testamentary transfer. 6'
1. The Background of Boggs
Isaac Boggs, the father, worked for South Central Bell for
thirty-six years.62 During this time, Isaac was married to Dorothy
until she died.6 Dorothy and Isaac had three sons.64 Dorothy left
Isaac an usufruct' in two-thirds of her estate and one-third
outright to Isaac.'
Isaac married Sandra soon after Dorothy's
6
7
death.
When Isaac retired, he received a lump sum from the Bell
System Savings Plan.M Isaac also received AT&T stock shares and
a monthly annuity payment.69 Isaac took the lump-sum payment
and rolled it over into an IRA. 70 He died after about ten years of
marriage to Sandra.7' Isaac's will left Sandra a life estate in his
share of the pension plan, with the remainder to his sons after her
death.72 Sandra also received all the other assets not included in
the pension plan benefits.73

57. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2369 (West 1998).
58. Propst, supra note 56, at 1008. According to Boggs, ERISA now
preempts community property laws. Boggs, 520 U.S. at 834.
59. Boggs, 520 U.S. at 835.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 836.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Boggs, 520 U.S. at 836.
65. An usufruct is essentially the common law equivalent of a life estate.
Id. The Louisiana Civil Code explains an usufruct as a "real right of limited
duration on the property of another." LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 535 (West
1998). Therefore, since Isaac had an usufruct, the sons had a vested
remainder interest in the property held in usufruct. Boggs, 520 U.S. at 835.
66. Boggs, 520 U.S. at 836.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. The stock was awarded as part of the Bell South Employee Stock
Ownership Plan (ESOP). Id.
70. An IRA is an Individual Retirement Account. Id.
71. Boggs, 520 U.S. at 836.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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The ProceduralHistory of Boggs

Two of the three sons claimed a share of Isaac's estate in state
court and wanted an accounting of the value of the benefits. 7'
Sandra petitioned the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana, questioning the validity of Dorothy's bequest
of Isaac's pension plan benefits. v5 Sandra argued that the sons'
claim was
76 preempted by ERISA since it was based on Dorothy's
bequest.
The district court noted that ERISA did not preempt
Louisiana's community property law. 7
It therefore granted
summary judgment to the sons,6 relying on Louisiana law.79 The
court found no assignment or alienation of pension plan benefits
because Dorothy's interest had already vested, 0 and accordingly
was valid at the time of her bequest.8
Sandra appealed to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, 2 which
affirmed the judgment of the district court.'
The Fifth Circuit
74. Id. Two of the three sons filed suit in state court after Isaac's death
requesting an accounting from an independent expert. Id. at 837. The sons
wanted the accounting to cover their percentage of Isaac's retirement benefits
because of Dorothy's testamentary transfer. Id. The sons wanted portions of
Isaac's IRA, his shares of AT&T stock, monthly annuity payments, and the
survivor annuity payments. Id.
75. Id. Sandra, the second wife, contested whether Dorothy's testamentary
transfer was valid based on Sandra's interest in those benefits, which derived
both from Isaac's will and from 29 U.S.C. § 1055. Id. at 837. Sandra asked for
declaratory judgment establishing ERISA's preemption of Louisiana
community property law with regard to the sons' claims based on their
mother's testamentary transfer. Id.
76. Boggs, 520 U.S. at 837.
77. Boggs v. Boggs, 849 F. Supp. 462, 467 (E.D. La. 1994), affd, 82 F.3d 90
(5th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 520 U.S. 833 (1997).
78. Id.
79. Id. The District Court reasoned that since state law allowed Dorothy
an undivided interest in all marital assets acquired during marriage, she had
an interest in the benefits acquired during her marriage. Id. The Appellate
Court found that the spouse's interest in the benefits under community
property law did not violate ERISA's spendthrift provision (the provision
prohibiting alienation or assignment) because Congress could not have
intended to change traditional family law. Boggs v. Boggs, 82 F.3d 90, 97 (5th
Cir. 1996).
80. The circuit court found that since community property law vested each
spouse automatically with an interest in assets earned during marriage,
ownership already existed and no transaction was necessary. Boggs, 82 F.3d
at 97. The court found that because no transaction was necessary, there was
no alienation or assignment of the interest. Id.
81. Boggs, 849 F. Supp. at 467. See supra note 79 for a discussion on how
and why the lower court found no assignment of interests under community
property law and therefore no violation of ERISA. The district court found
Dorothy's attempted testamentary transfer valid because of ERISA's silence
on protecting all of the benefits for the beneficiary. Id. at 465.
82. Boggs, 82 F.3d at 90.
83. Id. at 93.
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held that Louisiana law only affects pension plans after the
benefits have been distributed, not before nor while the plan
administrator controls them.' After this decision, a conflict arose
between the Ninth Circuit's 1991 decision, Ablamis v. Roper," and
the Fifth Circuit. The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari
and resolved the conflict by reversing the Fifth
Circuity.
E. Preemption:Why Can FederalLaw Do That?
The Supremacy Clause in the United States Constitution
permits federal preemption of state law." The Supreme Court has
limited the Supremacy Clause by holding that "state law must do
major damage to clear and substantial federal interests before the
Supremacy Clause will demand that the state law be preempted." 9
84. Id. at 97. The appellate court stressed that state law affects what the
participant does with his benefits after he has received them, not what the
plan administrator does with them prior to distribution. Id. Some of the
justices on the Fifth Circuit asked for a rehearing en banc, which was denied.
Boggs, 82 F.3d 90 (5th Cir. 1996) reh'g en banc denied (July 16, 1996). Only
six judges on the court of appeals wanted to rehear the case en banc and were
therefore disappointed when it did not come through. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833,
837 (1997). The justices believed that allowing a spouse to devise pension plan
benefits in a testamentary transfer would defeat ERISA's purposes of
guaranteeing participants and their beneficiaries the benefits and "of securing
national uniformity in pension plan administration." Id. at 838.
85. 937 F.2d 1450, 1460 (9th Cir. 1991). The Supreme Court agreed to hear
the case in part because there was a conflict between circuits. Boggs, 520 U.S.
at 839. The Fifth Circuit and the Ninth Circuit reached substantially
different results on the same issue. Id. In Ablamis v. Roper, the Ninth Circuit
held "that ERISA preempts a testamentary transfer by a non-participant
spouse of [her] community property interest in undistributed pension plan
benefits" was not allowed. Id.
86. Boggs, 520 U.S. at 839.
87. Id.
88. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.

This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby,
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.
Id. See also Mount Olivet Cemetery Ass'n v. Salt Lake City, 961 F. Supp.
1547, 1550 (D. Utah 1997) (stating that "state laws that 'interfere with, or are
contrary to the laws of [Clongress, made in pursuance of the [Clonstitution'...
are invalid under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution" (cites from
original omitted)).
89. Vecino, supra note 9, at 589-90. See also Florida Lime & Avocado
Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963), reh'g denied, (June 17, 1963)
(stating that, according to precedent, federal legislation should not preempt
state legislation, unless persuasive reasons exist for preemption. Examples of
such a reason include circumstances wherein the nature of the field leaves no
other rational conclusion, or a situation in which Congress has expressly
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Lower federal courts have limited the Supremacy Clause by
finding a rebuttable presumption that Congress does not intend to
preempt state law. 0
The Supreme Court has developed three different tests to
determine whether a federal law preempts a state law: express
preemption, conflict preemption, and field preemption. 1 Express
allowed preemption).
The Tenth Amendment clarifies the power of the federal government,
stating that "[tihe powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X. However, the United
States Supreme Court has held that the Tenth amendment is "but a truism
that all is retained which has not been surrendered." United States v. Darby,
312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).
90. See DeBuono v. NYSA-ILA Medical & Clinical Serv. Fund, 520 U.S.
806, 815-16 (1997) (holding that ERISA does not preempt a state tax on
hospitals, even when an ERISA plan benefit is taxed, because the statute
applies to everyone). See also Andrews-Clarke v. Travelers Ins. Co., 984 F.
Supp. 49, 57 (D. Mass. 1997) (observing that "[t]he key to § [1144] is found in
the words 'relate to'"); Mount Olivet Cemetery Ass'n, 961 F. Supp. at 1550
(citing Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981) (holding that
"[clonsideration under the Supremacy Clause [of the Constitution] starts with
the basic assumption that Congress did not intend to displace state law"
(internal citations omitted))). The court in Andrews-Clarke noted that
Congress used the words in the preemption clause in ERISA in their broadest
meanings possible. Andrews-Clarke, 984 F. Supp. at 57. Congress rejected
the more limited language that would have only preempted state laws relating
to specific issues covered by ERISA. Id. The court defined the phrase "relates
to" as any law connected with or that makes a reference to any employee
benefit plan. Id.
However, cases have also held that whenever Congress enacts a law,
that law preempts any state laws possibly existing in the field. See Shaw v.
Delta Airlines, 463 U.S. 85, 106-07 (1983) (holding that ERISA preempts state
law categorizing pregnancy as a disability because ERISA covers plans and
not parts of plans). See also Andrews-Clarke, 984 F. Supp. at 49 (holding that
ERISA preempted state tort remedies when the deceased was injured because
of a denial of benefits from an ERISA plan by a medical care provider).
Compare Andrews-Clarke, 984 F. Supp. at 49 (see above sentence for the
holding of Andrews-Clarke) with Boggs, 520 U.S. at 841 (holding in part that
ERISA and community property laws conflict with each other to an extent
where ERISA should preempt state law).
91. Mount Olivet Cemetery Ass'n, 961 F. Supp. at 1552 (observing that if the
federal legislation contains an "express congressional intent" to preempt state
law, the federal statute will preempt the state law. If the express intent is not
expressed, the federal law may still preempt the state law implicitly, by
conflict or field preemption.). See also Boggs, 520 U.S. at 860-61 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (stating that the courts should look to whether the state law
involves a field already covered by federal legislation or a field which Congress
reserved for federal legislation). When a court decides whether or not there is
federal preemption of state law, it must look to Congress' purpose, or reason,
for enacting the law. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 95 (citing Jones v. Rath Packing Co.,
430 U.S. 519 (1977)). Whether preemption is express or implied, it occurs
whether it is "explicitly stated in the statute's language or implicitly contained
in its structure and purpose." Id.
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preemption deals with the laws' exact words. 2
Conflict
preemption involves a direct conflict between federal and state
laws.9 This test examines whether it is physically impossible to
obey both laws and still retain "federal superintendence of the
field."" Field preemption examines the idea that federal law
automatically preempts an entire field whenever it is enacted.
Field preemption, the last test, is based on the idea that when
Congress makes a law, it automatically preempts the entire field. 95
For a court to use the field preemption test, it must determine that
the "scheme of [the] federal regulation is so pervasive as to make
reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States
to supplement it .... "
Field preemption analysis involves
deciding whether the federal law involves "traditional state
regulation."'

92. Mount Olivet Cemetery Ass'n, 961 F. Supp. at 1552. This first test is
fairly easy and straightforward. Express preemption exists when Congress
specifically says that it intends to preempt state law. Id. The other two types
of preemption tests are more complex and are known as conflict preemption
and field preemption. Boggs, 520 U.S. at 841. See also Mount Olivet Cemetery
Ass'n, 961 F. Supp. at 1552 (holding that there is a "reasonable inference" that
Congress left no room in a field for state law).
93. Mount Olivet Cemetery Ass'n, 961 F. Supp. at 1553.
94. FloridaLime &Avocado Growers, Inc., 373 U.S. at 142. See also Mount
Olivet Cemetery Ass'n, 961 F. Supp. at 1553 for further discussion. If it is
physically impossible to obey both laws, then the federal law preempts the
state law. Id. When it is impossible to obey both state and federal statutes,
then a court should use conflict preemption. Id. Courts should also use
conflict preemption when obeying the state law would create an obstacle to
fully carrying out the purpose of the federal statute. Id. (citing Freightliner
Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287 (1995)). Likewise, if it is not physically
impossible to obey both laws and the state law is not an obstacle to the federal
statute's purpose, then the federal law does not preempt the state law and
both are valid. Id. The Supreme Court in Boggs used conflict preemption to
decide whether ERISA preempted state community property laws or not.
Boggs, 520 U.S. at 844.
95. Mount Olivet Cemetery Ass'n, 961 F. Supp. at 1552.
96. Id. at 1552. For example, in Andrews-Clarke, the court found that it
was Congress' partial intent to protect employers and ERISA plans from
complying with conflicting state laws. 984 F. Supp. 49, 58 (D. Mass. 1997).
Congress intended this protection only in order to achieve ERISA's full intent.
Id. The court's holding was limited to medical care providers who provide care
under ERISA plans. Id. The court found that because ERISA had at one time
provided a remedy for abuses by medical care providers and that provision had
been removed, Congress had preempted the entire field. Id.
97. California Div. of Lab. Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr.,
N.A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 325 (1997) (citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,
331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). Justice Breyer's dissent in Boggs urged the Court to
use this type of test to determine that ERISA preempted Louisiana's state
community property laws. Boggs, 520 U.S. at 858. The dissent points out that
the Louisiana law makes no reference to ERISA and therefore should not be
preempted. Id. Justice Breyer also noted that the Louisiana statute made no
mention of ERISA or pension plans at all, but rather only referred to estates in
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The field preemption test has two prongs. 98 The reviewing
court must first ask whether the federal law concerns traditional
state law. 99 Courts are more likely to answer yes if the law affects
the relationships between the employee/beneficiary and plan
administrator. " Next, the court must ask whether a federal law
relates to a traditional area of state law.'
To do this, the court
looks to whether the state law refers to the federal law in
question.'
If the state law does refer to that law, then the federal
law will probably preempt it.' 03 Yet, even if the state law does not
refer to the federal statute, it still may be preempted if the court
finds a "connection with ERISA plans.""° ' In order to determine
whether a state law has a connection with a federal statute, the
court must examine the legislative history of that statute and
Congress' objectives in enacting it." °5
II.

PREEMPTION Is NOT PROPER IN BOGGS BECAUSE...

The Court in Boggs held that ERISA does preempt state
community property law because state community property law
interferes with ERISA's purpose." The Court did not adhere to its

general and included all marital assets. Id. Justice Breyer continued noting
that the Louisiana statute also does not "act exclusively on, or rely on the
existence of, ERISA plans." Id. Therefore, Justice Breyer concluded, in part,
that ERISA did not preempt Louisiana state law. Id. at 859-60.
98. See Shaw v. Delta Airlines, 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983) (holding the test
for whether a state law relates to ERISA to be whether the law is connected in
some way with or somehow refers to pension plans.). See also Dillingham, 519
U.S. at 324 (citing District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506
U.S. 125, 129 (1992)) (stating that the test involves "a two-part inquiry: a law
'relate[s] to' a covered employee benefit plan for purposes of § 514(a) 'if it [1]
has a connection with or [2] reference to such a plan'); Sommers Drug Stores
Co. Employee Profit Sharing Trust v. Corrigan Enter., Inc., 793 F.2d 1456,
1465 (5th Cir. 1986) (adopting the test delineated in Shaw).
99. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 95-96.
100. Sommers, 793 F.2d at 1467.
101. Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 324-25.
102. Id. at 324.
103. See id. (explaining that when a state statute refers to ERISA plans,
such a reference must have an immediate and exclusive effect on ERISA plans
in order for the federal statute to preempt the state statute).
104. Id. at 338.
105. Auslander v. Helfand, 988 F. Supp. 576, 578 (D. Md. 1997) (holding that
a reviewing court must consider multiple factors before determining that
ERISA preempts a state statute. The factors include examining the purpose of
ERISA and its associated statutes, the scope of the state law Congress
intended to survive, and how the state statute will actually effect ERISA
plans). While this court talked only about ERISA preemption, it noted that
"ERISA pre-emption analysis does not differ significantly from traditional preemption analysis." Id.
106. Boggs, 520 U.S. at 853. The Court analogized savings bonds cases to
ERISA plans concerning the community property interest and who should
receive it. Id.
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previous holdings, and it is now uncertain which test should be
followed. °7 Section A discusses how the holding in Boggs is
inconsistent with the purpose of ERISA, federal policy and
previous holdings of the Supreme Court. Section B analyzes the
preemption portion of ERISA and how it affects beneficiaries and
their interests. Section C examines how the words "relates to"
from the preemption portion of ERISA should be applied to state
statutes. Section D explores why the consistent application of law
policy should not be applied in this situation. Section E addresses
situations where beneficiaries currently lose their benefit interests
through the application of ERISA.
A.
1.

What Seems to be the Problems with Boggs?

Boggs versus the Stated Purpose of ERISA

When the Boggs Court found that ERISA preempted
Louisiana state probate law, °8 it ignored the fact that distribution
of the benefits had already been made. Why is this important?
The decision in Boggs extends ERISA's scope beyond protecting
plan participants and their beneficiaries from plan administrators'
abuses'°9 to protecting the beneficiaries from the plan
participants." 0°
The Boggs Court justified its decision by
contending that the purpose of ERISA is to protect beneficiaries."'
Even though these benefits exist, the detriments outweigh the
benefits. Congress made no provision for first spouses who live in
community property states, remain married until death and die
before the participant."2 Therefore, under ERISA and Boggs,
second spouses can take all the benefits from the family of the
participant.13
Until ERISA was amended by REA, Congress did not give the
protection of beneficiaries and their interests from plan
participants as a reason for the passing of ERISA."' Congress

107. This creates more problems for the law in the area of preemption. The
Supreme Court in Boggs held that conflict preemption was appropriate when

dealing with ERISA and community property laws. Id. at 844. However, the
Court was not clear that courts should evaluate ERISA cases using conflict
preemption. Id.
108. Id. at 835.
109. H.R. REP. No. 93-533, at 4641 (1974).

110. Boggs, 520 U.S. at 859 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
111. Id. at 843. The Court noted that ERISA was enacted to provide the
beneficiaries a source of income after the participant dies. Id. at 843.
112. See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B) (making no special provisions for spouses
in community property states).
113. Id.; Boggs, 520 U.S. at 835.
114. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B). In the 1970s, Congress noticed that plan
administrators were abusing the plans they were supposed to be safeguarding
for the participants. H.R. REP. No. 93-533, at 4643 (1973). Congress declared
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instead debated how to protect participants and beneficiaries from
plan administrators." 5 The legislative history of REA, however,
debates a spouse's interest in the benefits.16
REA protects
divorced spouses over predeceasing spouses.1 7 Congress never
mentioned predeceasing, non-participating spouses who had an
interest in the plan arising from the application of community
property laws." 8 By holding that such spouses have no such
interest, state law notwithstanding, the Boggs decision is
inconsistent with the stated purpose of ERISA, i.e., to protect
participants and their dependents from plan administrators.
2. Boggs, FederalPreemption Policy and Precedent
Despite the holding in Boggs, federal law does not, and should
not, automatically preempt state law."9 If Congress enacts a law,
however, some cases seem to state that Congress automatically
preempts the entire field concerning that law. 2 ° In both Shaw v.
Delta Airlines and Andrews-Clarke v. Travelers Insurance Co., the
courts found that since ERISA discussed the fields of disability
benefits and medical benefits respectively, both those fields were
completely preempted."' In Boggs, the Court went one step too far
that REA was being enacted in order to allow equity for participants, their
spouses and their dependent children. S. REP. No. 98-575, at 2547 (1984),
reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2547.
115. S. REP. No. 98-575, at 2547.
116. Id. at 2564.
117. Id. Congress was concerned about non-participating spouses being cut
off from their only retirement funds at the death of their participating
spouses. Id. In the legislative history of REA, Congress never mentions
protecting predeceasing spouses, let alone non-participating, predeceasing
spouses. Id. at 2549, 2564.
118. Id. at 2549, 2564.
119. The argument being made here is mainly one of public policy. However,
the text of ERISA supports the argument because it exempts certain state
laws. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1994). See also Ingersoll-Rand Co. v.
McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 139-42 (1990) (explaining that Texas state wrongful
discharge law is preempted because it conflicts with ERISA and covers the
exact purpose of ERISA); Ablamis v. Roper, 937 F.2d 1450, 1455-56 (9th Cir.
1991) (explaining that ERISA preempts California state community property
laws in testamentary transfers because such transfers do not fall under
acceptable QDROs, or any other exception to ERISA). Compare Boggs, 520
U.S. at 858-59, with Andrews-Clarke v. Travelers Ins. Co., 984 F. Supp. 49, 49
(D. Mass. 1997) (holding that ERISA does preempt the entire field of medical
benefits enforcement and remedies when the granting of medical benefits has
been abused by denying benefits when the ERISA plan covers the medical
benefits). There is a rebuttable presumption that Congress does not intend to
preempt state law. DeBuono v. NYSA-ILA Medical & Clinical Serv. Fund, 520
U.S. 806, 814 (1997).
120. See Shaw v. Delta Airlines, 463 U.S. 85, 100 (1983) (seeming to suggest
that Congress does generally preempt a given field by passing a law in that
field).
121. Id.;Andrews-Clarke, 984 F. Supp. at 53.
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along this path. 2'
Courts apply field preemption as a final test after examining
the other two available tests.123 ERISA, a comprehensive statute,
provides for cases where it does not preempt state laws in its
savings clause."2
Therefore, some state laws exist which do
obstruct its purpose. 1n ERISA is pervasive enough to preempt
laws that relate to it; however, if the state law is one of general
application, the language of ERISA and relevant precedent
conclude that it is not preempted. '
By holding that merely
because a law affects ERISA benefits it is thereby preempted, the
Boggs holding is also inconsistent with policy and precedent."'
B. ERISA's Spendthrift Provisionand State Law
Congress did not intend for ERISA to cover all fields of law,

122.

See EDWIN CHEMERINSKY,

CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW: PRINCIPLES

AND

POLICIES 291 (1997) (discussing the theories and practices behind field and
conflict preemption).
123. Id. Field preemption is also known as implied or implicit preemption.
Id. Because this test allows the widest scope of preemption, it is used only
when called for by the comprehensive nature of the statute. it because the
statute is comprehensive. Id. Congress will preempt a field if the law seems
to provide detailed instructions for their law in that field. CHEMERINSKY,
supra note 122, at 292. See also supra Part I.E. for a discussion of the
different types of preemption.
124. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 90-91; see also 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1994) (setting forth
the conflict savings clause of ERISA).
125. This seems to argue that the Boggs court erred when it applied a
conflict preemption test to ERISA and state community property laws. Boggs,
520 U.S. at 841. The Court stated that since community property law
conflicted with the purpose of ERISA, those laws should be preempted. Id.
However, ERISA specifically provides for areas where conflicting laws may
exist. 29 U.S.C. § 1144. If conflicting laws can exist, then conflict preemption
does not seem to be a valid test for ERISA problems. Lastly, the Court has
found that if a law does not "relate to" ERISA, it is not preempted. DeBuono
v. NYSA-ILA Medical & Clinical Serv. Fund, 520 U.S. 806, 815-16 (1997). See
also Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 139-40 (1990) (holding
that law "related to" ERISA, and therefore preempted).
126. For a more detailed explanation of the "relates to" test, see infra Part
II.C.1., Ingersoll-Rand, 498 U.S. at 139, and DeBuono, 520 U.S. at 815-16.
ERISA is not so pervasive that it preempts the field of all laws affecting
ERISA. See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 238 (1984) (holding
that state laws providing remedies against nuclear companies were not
preempted by the National Nuclear Regulatory Act, even though that act
extensively covered the field of nuclear regulation); see also California Div. of
Lab. Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316,
326 (1997) (holding that California state law concerning the payment of
apprentices does not obstruct ERISA's purpose and therefore is not preempted
by ERISA); Auslander v. Helfand, 988 F. Supp. 576, 579-80 (D. Md. 1997)
(holding that ERISA does not preempt Maryland state release law in the area
of wrongful discharge).
127. See supra note 126 (discussing effect of ERISA on state laws).
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since it specifically exempts certain types of state laws."4 ERISA
"supersede[s] any and all State laws insofar as they may now or
hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan .... Later in this
provision, however, it exempts insurance, banking and securities
30
laws from ERISA's application.'
Moreover, the provision also
131
laws.
criminal
state
exempts
ERISA's silence on state community property laws and its
effect on those laws is not indicative of inclusion. 132 Instead, the
silence implies Congress never thought about the situation at all.
Previous cases have held that silence does not automatically mean
a field is included in the scope of a federal
statute, if the field is
3
one that could be expected to be included."1
The Boggs decision creates a curious situation. ERISA now
exempts banking laws, but not probate laws, from its control.
Probate and banking laws are similar in that neither is enacted
specifically to affect ERISA plans."
By allowing ERISA to
preempt state community property law, a field similar to probate
law, the Court allows other areas of law, which are traditionally
less controlled by states than probate laws, to remain unaffected.
Because preemption permits states to retain control of fields they
have traditionally controlled, the new result of ERISA is
inconsistent with preemption.
"29

C. "Relates To" and ERISA
1.

"Relates To" can be Interpretedin Many Ways

The Court uses the words "relates to" as being key in ERISA's
preemption section."' Section 1144 of ERISA provides that all
state laws relating to ERISA are preempted. 13 In Boggs, however,
the Court ignored the words "relate to" and instead used straight
conflict preemption simply because the laws affected an ERISA
128. Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b) (1998).

129. Id. § 1144(a). The preemption provision specifically exempts any plans
not subject to ERISA. Id.
130. Id. § 1144(b)(2)(A).
131. Id. § 1144(b)(4).
132. There is no mention of community property laws or how ERISA or REA
will affect those state laws. S. REP. No. 98-575, at 2549, 2564 (1984).
133. Vecino, supra note 9, at 606. See also supra note 126 for examples of
cases in which courts held that fields of law not mentioned in ERISA were not
preempted because ERISA was silent on the matter.
134. This is logical because banking and probate laws have existed at

common law and ERISA was first enacted in 1974. Because banking and
probate laws pre-date ERISA, they do not specifically mention or affect ERISA
and therefore should not relate to ERISA plans. Using the Court's test, if the
laws do not relate to ERISA, then they should not be preempted by ERISA.
Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 841 (1997).
135. Shaw v. Delta Airlines, 463 U.S. 85, 97-98 (1983).

136. 29 U.S.C. § 1144.
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plan.'37 In previous cases, the Court has rejected an overbroad
interpretation of "relates to" because everything relates to
everything else in this world, if examined closely enough." Using
field preemption, as Justice Breyer's dissent urges,13 9 is more
can be followed
logical because state community property laws
14
without conflicting with or obstructing ERISA. 0
Justice Scalia wrote that the words "relates to" should only
set up a way to determine whether a field preemption analysis is
appropriate.14' He argued express or conflict preemption should
If "relates to" were
not be used when "relates to" appears.'
interpreted broadly, then any state law might be preempted based
on the most remote effect on ERISA.'
In DeBuono v. NYSA-ILA Medical & Chemical Service Fund,
the Court explained that ERISA did not preempt a state hospital
tax affecting ERISA plans simply because holders of the plans
The Court stated that since
were also required to pay the tax.'
the law was not enacted for the sole purpose of affecting ERISA
plans, but instead applied to everyone, the state law was not
preempted. 4' Community property laws affect all assets earned by
all resident couples." They are laws of general application, just
like the tax law in DeBuono.'47 Therefore, there is no reason why
the community property laws should be treated any differently
than other laws of general application.'"
2.

The Boggs Court and Louisiana'sProbateLaws

The Court found that ERISA preempted the state community
property probate and distribution laws.'49 Probate laws apply to
everyone who lives in the state, not only to those with ERISA

137. Boggs, 520 U.S. at 841.

138. See DeBuono v. NYSA-ILA Medical & Chemical Serv. Fund, 520 U.S.
806, 813-15 (1997) (explaining that the words "relate to" should not be
interpreted in their broadest sense because then all state laws would be
preempted by ERISA since everything relates to everything else in today's
world). For similar discussion of the "relates to" test, see also Ingersoll-Rand
Co. v. McClendan, 498 U.S. 133, 139 (1990), and Shaw, 463 U.S. at 92.
139. Boggs, 520 U.S. at 859-61 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

140. Id.
141. Zanglein, supra note 55, at 588.

142.
143.
144.
145.

Id.
DeBuono, 520 U.S. at 812-13.
Id. at 815-16.
Id. at 818.

146. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2369 (West 1998).
147. DeBuono, 520 U.S. at 818.
148. Community property states will be treated differently than noncommunity property states; however, that is a problem of state law and courts

should not look to ERISA for the solution.
149. Boggs, 520 U.S. at 854.
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plans.' O The laws apply to all property owned by the deceased,
with no differentiation between benefits and other property. 5 '
Therefore, according to the analysis in DeBuono, Louisiana state
community property laws should not be preempted by ERISA.
In Auslander v. Helfand, the plaintiff sought benefits from his
former employer's ERISA plan. 5' The plaintiff had been fired for
embezzling funds.'5 The parties settled on the condition that the
plaintiff waive all related claims.TM The District Court found that
"Maryland's law of release does not 'refer to' ERISA-qualified
plans because waiver and release are principles of general
applicability."'55 The court used a conflict preemption test to
determine that ERISA did not preempt Maryland's release law.66
The Auslander court stated that because Maryland's law was not
"an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress," the law was not preempted by ERISA."7
Since community property laws are not an encumbrance to
ERISA's application, they should not be preempted.
3.

Which Test Should the Boggs Court Have Used?

In Boggs, the Court found that state community property law
was preempted because of a conflict in state and federal laws."
However, state community property laws do not present an
obstacle to ERISA's purposes. Nor do state community property
laws meet any of the types of laws intended to be preempted.'59
State community property laws do not dictate to administrators
the structure of plans. 60 They do not "bind administrators to a
particular choice" 6' because they only affect the benefits after the

150. See 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1 (West 1998) (applying the default

probate rules to all residents of Illinois, no matter where they are at the time
of their death).
151. See id. (making special provisions only for real estate located inside the
state).
152. Auslander v. Helfand, 988 F. Supp. 576, 577 (D. Md. 1997).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 578.
149. Id.

157. Auslander, 988 F. Supp. at 578 (internal citations omitted). The court
found that there were three kinds of state laws that Congress intended ERISA
to preempt: those that require certain "employee benefit structures or
[methods of] plan administration"; those that force employers or
administrators to make certain choices or otherwise "preclud[e] uniform
administrative practice"; and those that allow alternative means of enforcing
ERISA claims. Id. at 578-79.
158. Boggs, 520 U.S. at 854.
159. Auslander, 988 F. Supp. at 578-79.
160. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2369 (West 1998) (containing no discussion
on any specific structure of plans).
161. Id. at 579.
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benefits have been distributed."2 Community property laws also
do not provide an "alternate enforcement mechanism for ERISA
claims"" because they do not specifically deal with ERISA claims
at all.' 6
Because the Court has proposed the "relates to" test and its
application in ERISA issues, the Court should remain consistent
and apply that test to state community property laws. This would
mean that the laws would not be preempted by ERISA because the
laws were not enacted for the sole purpose of affecting ERISA
plans. Laws that generally affect issues outside of ERISA plans
are not obstacles to ERISA's application.
D. Uniform Application of Laws and ERISA
Preemption is supposed to allow for uniform enforcement of
laws." That way, ERISA would be enforced in the same manner
throughout the country.'6 If a couple lived in a community
property state for a few years, and then moved to a noncommunity property state, like Illinois or Florida, proponents of
this theory argue executors would be saddled with extra work.
The executor or administrator would have to create separate
accountings: one recording contributions made within the
community property state and a 6 second
recording those
7
contributions made outside of that state.
There are several flaws with this theory. There is no reason
why probate laws should be uniform throughout the country.
Probate is an area traditionally regulated by the states."'
Currently, if a couple moves from a community property state into
a non-community property state, technically, it is standard
practice in the probate field for the executor of wills to create one
list of assets earned in community property state and one list of
assets earned in the non-community property state. He would
have to determine the value of the assets earned by the couple
while in the community property state and the value of the assets

162. Boggs, 520 U.S. at 861 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
163. Auslander, 988 F. Supp. at 579.

164. See Boggs, 520 U.S. at 860-61 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (explaining that
community property laws do not relate to ERISA because they do not mention
ERISA plans at all).
165. Id. at 852.
166. For further review, see Vecino, supra note 9, at 585 and Julie McDaniel
Dallison, Comment, DisappearingInterests: ERISA Impliedly Preempts the
Predeceasing Nonemployee Spouse's Community Property Interest in the
Employee's Retirement, 49 BAYLOR L. REV. 477, 481-82 (1997).
167. Plan administrators must determine how much is owed to the
participants and to their beneficiaries.
168. For more specific information, see Propst, supra note 56, at 1019, and

Treacy, supra note 2, at 2.
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earned by the couple while in the non-community property state.16
The executor would have to do this so
that he would know what
170
was included in the deceased's estate.
If the couple lived in Louisiana for ten years and Illinois for
ten years, the executor of the estate would have to compute two
accountings: one accounting to determine the assets earned during
the time in Louisiana and another to determine those earned in
Illinois.17 ' The same problem occurs if the couple moves from a
non-community property state into a community property state.
Because this complexity exists for plans outside of ERISA,
allowing a non-participating, predeceasing spouse an interest in
the plan does not increase the complexity of the accountings or add
any work to anyone's job. Considering the current inconsistency in
ERISA by exempting fields of law, allowing spouses to retain their
interests does not increase, nor decrease, the inconsistency.
E. If the Purpose is to ProtectBeneficiaries, Then Why Can
the Following Situations Occur?
The Supreme Court has found that one of ERISA's purposes is
to protect beneficiaries' interests in benefits. 172 However, the
Court has also held in multiple cases that ERISA does not prevent
certain agencies from taking all of a beneficiary's interest in the
benefits.'73

169. See 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1 (West 1998) (including the property of
an Illinois resident in the default probate rules). See also LA. CIV. CODE ANN.
art. 2369 (West 1998) (including property earned while a resident of Louisiana
in the application of community property rules).
170. Once an interest vests, the law considers it a present interest and it
cannot be divested, unless special circumstances exist.
CORNELIUS J.
MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 123-25 (2d ed.
1988). Therefore, the spouse's interest in the benefits could not be divested
without a condition allowing for divestment. Id. Also, spouses consider the
pension plans as assets of their estates when they do estate planning. Not
only do the spouses, but when applying for mortgages, the lenders also
consider pension plan assets as assets of the couple applying for the loan.
171. See supra note 169 (explaining what property is included and under
which statute the property must be considered when determining the assets
included in a decedent's estate).
172. Ablamis v. Roper, 937 F.2d at 1450, 1455 (9th Cir. 1991); Boggs, 520
U.S. at 845.
173. See DeBuono v. NYSA-ILA Medical & Chemical Serv. Fund, 520 U.S.
806, 816 (1997) (holding that a general tax imposed by the state on hospitals
can be passed on to ERISA plans, even where the tax may interfere with a
beneficiary's interest); Andrews-Clarke v. Travelers Ins. Co., 984 F. Supp. 49,
59 (D. Mass. 1997) (holding that insurance companies can effectively negate a
beneficiary's right to medical treatment); In re Sayler, 98 B.R. 536, 541
(Bankr. D. Kan. 1987) (holding that a participant's creditors could take all of
the benefits in order to cover debts, if the plans were created to avoid payment
of the debts).
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What About Divorce Situations?

ERISA allows for beneficiaries' interests to be taken by some
other party174 by not only exempting state banking, insurance and
securities laws, but also providing for QDRO exceptions. 7 5 This
means that a divorced spouse can get a court order taking some of
the current spouse's benefits. In today's world, many marriages
fail, which means that many ERISA plans will be affected by at
least one QDRO.
Imagine a situation where a person is married four times
during his life. If each spouse obtains a QDRO, then the last
spouse's interest will be decreased, because of the three preceding
QDROs. According to Boggs, if those previous spouses die before
the last spouse, the last spouse will not lose any benefits due to the
previous spouses' wills." The last spouse has security in knowing
her benefits will remain intact.
The detriments of QDROs as currently written, however,
outweigh their benefits. In the above hypothetical, there would be
three spouses with an interest in that plan. Currently under
ERISA, if the participant has a child with one spouse, then that
spouse can attach more of the benefits because of child support
obligations.'
Therefore, under ERISA as it is currently written,
by the time the plan participant dies, the last spouse may be left
with less than twenty percent of her full interest in the benefits
due to valid QDROs.'78 ERISA allows divorced spouses to obtain
an interest in the benefits through QDROs,'79 thereby reducing the
beneficiary's interest in those benefits.
2. Insurance Companies and Benefits
Currently, insurance companies can take all of a beneficiary's
benefits. In Andrews-Clarke, a plan participant sued her plan's
administrators for the wrongful death of her alcoholic husband 8'

174. See 29 U.S.C. § 1056 (1994) (allowing state banking and insurance laws
to preempt ERISA, therefore opening the possibility of the beneficiary losing
all of his or her interest in the benefits).
175. Id. § 1055.
176. Boggs, 520 U.S. at 841.
177. See 29 U.S.C. § 1056 (allowing spouses to attach pension plans under
state family law and containing no restriction on the amount that can be
attached).
178. The Boggs holding also means that a divorced spouse has more rights to
a participant's benefits than a spouse who remains married until his death.
Boggs v. Boggs Holds. .. , supra note 9, at 10. This cannot be a policy that
Congress intended to encourage. If this policy were true, then it would be
more economically advantageous to divorce someone than to remain married.
Therefore, the Court's decision is contrary to the public policy of supporting

and promoting marriage and stable families.
179. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(b).
180. Andrews-Clarke, 984 F. Supp. at 52 (explaining that the health care
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who had sought treatment.18 The plan's medical advisor refused
to admit him into a rehabilitation program, even though the plan
allowed for such a program.'82 Because of his failure to receive
treatment, the husband committed suicide. 183 The District Court of
Massachusetts found that ERISA preempted the participant's
cause of action and therefore left her without damages. 8'
If the purpose of ERISA truly is to protect beneficiaries, then
Andrews-Clarke was wrongly decided. However, it has not been
overturned. 8 The participant was not only denied her entitled
benefits, but was also denied any recourse." The District Court
found that ERISA controlled, and no way to remedy the situation
existed.'87
Insurance companies should be able to protect themselves
from going bankrupt. One way they can do this is by controlling
the care their beneficiaries receive, which helps control health care
costs.'" By controlling health care costs, people can better afford
health care, whether covered by insurance or not.88 Under ERISA,
however, insurance companies may reject viable and justified
treatment merely because of expense," ° even when the policy
allows for treatment.191
In Andrews-Clarke, ERISA did not protect the interest of a

provider had wrongfully refused rehabilitation treatment to the participant's
husband thereby causing his death).
181. Id. at 51.
182. Id.
183. Id.

184. Id. at 53. The participant's cause of action was for "breach of contract,
medical malpractice, wrongful death, loss of parental and spousal consortium,

intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and specific
violations of the Massachusetts consumer protection laws." Id. at 52.
185. A January 15, 1999 search of databases on the Westlaw and LexisNexis services revealed that a petition for certiorari had not yet been filed in
this case.
186. Andrews-Clarke, 984 F. Supp. at 53.
187. Id. at 65. The District Court found that ERISA preempted any state
remedy the participant might have had, because one of the goals of ERISA was
to protect employers and plans from conflicting state laws. Id. at 58.
However, this purpose was a way to promote ERISA's principal purpose of
protection. Id. The District Court found that the lack of remedies was not
because of an "overbroad application of ERISA's preemption clause, but rather
[because of] the failure of Congress to amend ERISA's civil enforcement
provision to keep pace with the changing realities of the health care system."
Id.
188. See David Tarrant, Managed Care Changing Doctor-PatientRelations,
GREENSBORO NEWS & REC. (Greensboro, N.C.), Sept. 8, 1998, at D4 (stating
that insurance companies are controlling the care received in order to keep
down costs).
189. Id.
190. Andrews-Clarke, 984 F. Supp. at 53.
191. This is the exact situation that occurred in Andrews-Clarke. Id.
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participant or her beneficiary from harm.91 2 If protecting
beneficiaries and participants from harm is truly the object of
ERISA, 9' then this case should be overturned. ERISA allows
insurance companies to deny benefits to plan participants and
their beneficiaries without giving either party recourse.
3. Bankruptcy and Benefits
Bankruptcy is another area where ERISA does not preempt
state law to protect beneficiaries. In In re Sayler, the Kansas
District Court found that ERISA did not preempt Kansas' state
bankruptcy law and therefore the plaintiffs creditors could attach
his benefits."
The participant, the plaintiff, invested his
retirement funds in an ERISA pension plan before filing
bankruptcy. 9 ' He then withdrew some of the funds to pay off
The court found that any insurance policies
other expenses."
purchased by the debtor when the debtor intended to commit fraud
were not exempted by ERISA.97
Creditors may attach benefits when the debtor created the
benefits only to thwart the creditors' claims. 98 ERISA tolerates
this situation by allowing state bankruptcy laws to remain in full
effect."'
ERISA places no limit on the attachable amount or
percentage of the benefits. 2" Therefore, it is theoretically possible
that creditors could attach all of the benefits, leaving the
beneficiary with nothing. If ERISA was enacted in order to protect
a beneficiary's interest in the ERISA plan benefits, then this
should not be possible. Based on the above stated inconsistencies
between ERISA and prior holdings, Congress should amend
ERISA to aid courts in applying ERISA as Congress originally
intended.
M

192. Id. at 52-53.
193. See supra notes 24-26 for an explanation of the purpose of ERISA

contained in the legislative history. Nowhere in the legislative history does
Congress state that ERISA is intended to protect beneficiaries and
participants from any and all harm. H.R. REP. NO. 93-533, at 4646-47, 467677 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639.
194. In re Sayler, 98 B.R. 536, 541 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1987).

195. Id. at 537.
196. The plan participant used the funds to pay taxes, pay off his mortgage,
buy new cars and other items for his household, "pay accounting and legal
fees," "pay off a personal loan at a bank," and "convert two existing [life
insurance policies]." Id.
197. Id. at 539. The court remanded the case for a finding of the
participant's intent in purchasing ERISA policies. Id. at 541.
198. 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1997).
199. Id.
200. Id.
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III. PROTECTING THE PEOPLE
Section A discusses exactly how ERISA should be amended in
Section B
order to avoid the community property problem.
discusses the problems with amending ERISA. Section C explains
why the amendment is the best solution, despite its problems.
A. Amending ERISA to Allow for Community Property
°
The way ERISA currently reads causes problems for courts.'O
Sometimes, a beneficiary's interest is protected through ERISA. °2
Other times, the interest is completely superseded by that of a
third party.0 ' Because of the conflicting results of the ERISA's
application, Congress should amend ERISA.
The best way for Congress to fix this problem is to amend the
QDROs provision. This provision of ERISA should be amended so
that probate orders would qualify as QDROs in more
circumstances. The wording should be as follows.

A spouse, or estate, with an interest in a pension plan
through the application of community property laws shall be
able to obtain a probate order stating the percentage of the
pension plan benefits to which the spouse, or estate, is
entitled. The percentage awarded shall be determined based
on the number of years the couple was married and the
number of years the plan was funded by marital monies. The
percentage to go to the spouse, or estate, cannot exceed fifty
percent (50%) of the total benefits, if there is/are (an)other
spouse(s) at the time of the participant's death.
While amending ERISA might not solve all of the problems, it
will help cure the most important ones.
B. The Created Problemsand ERISA
There will be problems with the above-suggested wording for
an amendment to ERISA. Heirs who may be entitled to some of
the benefits might have to pay extra lawyer's fees to have their

201. For example, in Emard v. Hughes Aircraft Co., the Ninth Circuit held
that Boggs did not extend to preempt state laws concerning ERISA insurance

policies. Emard v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 153 F.3d 949, 957 (9th Cir. 1998). In
Emard, the second husband wanted the insurance proceeds from his wife's
ERISA insurance policies. Id. at 952. The wife had never changed her
beneficiary from her first husband on those policies. Id. The second husband
argued that he had a constructive trust in the proceeds from those policies. Id.
at 954. The Ninth Circuit did not decide the case on the merits, but did decide
that ERISA did not preempt California community property law with respect
to constructive trusts and that the case had been improperly removed to
federal court. Id. at 961-962.
202. Sandra's interest was protected in a similar manner in Boggs v. Boggs,
520 U.S. 833 (1997).
203. In re Sayler, 98 B.R. 536, 541 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1987).
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interests determined. Heirs could also face significant court
delays in receiving funds. The delay would be due to the necessary
accounting to determine the exact percentage of any benefits to
which the heirs are entitled.
Another possible problem is the result that the Supreme
Court feared would occur in Boggs, i.e., the second spouse would be
left with nothing. 2"' Because the suggested amendment wording
allows spouses to receive a portion of the benefits according to how
long the couple was married, and only while the couple lived in a
community property state, the problem should be avoided.
Therefore, if the second spouse was married longer than the first
spouse, he should receive a greater portion of the benefits.
The other possible problem is that application of ERISA will
not be consistent throughout the country. Laws currently exist
that are not applied consistently throughout the country. For
example, individual states decide whether to adopt community
property laws. Each state also determines family law within its
borders, as well as laws concerning bankruptcy.
While adopting the suggested amendment would lead to an
inconsistent application of ERISA, such inconsistent application
already exists. Divorced spouses, for example, may currently
obtain a percentage interest in ERISA benefits. Allowing a spouse
to transfer his interest in a will, when that interest is already
vested, is not different from allowing divorced spouses to obtain
QDROs.
Either way, the surviving spouse's interest in the
benefits is lessened. The amendment will create problems, but it
solves more problems of greater magnitude than it creates.
C. Amending ERISA and the Resulting Problems
The proposed amendment's wording is not perfect.
Its
application will cause problems, but will solve more problems than
it creates. Spouses who should have an interest in plan benefits
will have that interest, whether or not they predecease the
participating spouse. This creates a greater certainty in estate
planning.
The amendment should also avoid a Boggs-type situation.
The first wife had thirty years of interest built up in the pension
plan, 5 yet her estate received nothing. Therefore, the sons
received nothing from either their father or their mother. 2' The
204. Boggs, 520 U.S. at 853. The Supreme Court feared that the second
spouse would be left with no retirement funds if it allowed the first spouse's
interest to go to the sons. Id.
205. Id. at 836.
206. Id. at 836-37. The Court did not discuss the sons' request for an
accounting. Id. at 837. The Court also did not attempt to value Dorothy's
share of Isaac's pension plan and grant the sons an equivalent from the estate.
Id. Either of these solutions would probably avoid the inequitable situation
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Court took away their inheritance by changing the law and
invalidating the estate planning that had been done.2 7
Boggs and ERISA currently affect the rights of the
participant. 0 8 According to Boggs, if the participant dies first,
then any testamentary transfer of the benefits he makes will be
invalid.2 9 His interest would be completely cut off, leaving all the
benefits to the surviving spouse who could transfer them by will.
This is not an equitable situation. By allowing a spouse, or an
estate, the right to a maximum fifty percent of the benefits, ERISA
would avoid also cutting off the participant's interest.
The other problem that would be avoided is that of any extra
taxes that may be due if an estate is found to contain more than
originally thought. If an estate defers distribution until after the
spouse dies, taxes are not due until then. If the courts then decide
that the estate was not due the property, then the taxes will be
overpaid, or, even worse, the estate may owe more taxes because of
various tax benefits allowed. Additional taxes may be due if the
estate is larger than was reported because of a spouse's benefits.
So, while the amendment will create problems, the amendment
introduces important solutions to current situations.
CONCLUSION
In Boggs v. Boggs, the Supreme Court held that a nonparticipating, predeceasing spouse could not leave his interest in
the participating spouse's pension benefits. This is so even though
community property law vests the spouse, participating or not,
predeceased or not, with a one-half interest in everything earned
by the couple while married. With the holding in Boggs, the Court
sent the message that it is better to be divorced than to remain
married.
ERISA allows divorced spouses to obtain court orders
entitling them to a percentage of the pension benefits. The order
must meet strict standards in order to qualify as a QDRO. By
amending ERISA to allow non-participating spouses to obtain
QDROs, Congress will avoid the inequitable situation created by
children and other descendants now face.
207. By amending ERISA, Congress would not send the message that
couples should get divorced in order to receive that to which state law says
their estate is entitled. Congress would also mend an inequitable situation, by
allowing spouses to keep their vested interests in plans. While some spouses
will be adversely affected, over all, most spouses' estates would benefit from
the change. At the very least, estate planners would be more secure in
making plans because of knowing it does not matter whom dies first, each
spouse receives his interest in the benefits.
208. Boggs v. Boggs Holds..., supra note 9, at 10.
209. Boggs, 520 U.S. at 843-44. The idea that a participant cannot transfer
his or her interest is extrapolated from the fact that spouse's cannot transfer
their interest in plan benefits.

1999]

Boggs v. Boggs

301

the Boggs decision.
In the Money-Bags' situation, if such an amendment existed
when the sons were in court, the outcome would have been
different. The sons would not be penniless because they would
have received their mother's share of the pension benefits. While
the stepmother would have received fewer benefits, she was not so
dependent on her second spouse that she needed those benefits in
the first place. Therefore, the proposed amendment provides an
equitable situation for those most affected by the current state of
the law.

